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Abstract
We study the pay of UK universities chief executives (‘vice-chancellors’) over a ten year period.
Although there is a correlation between pay and performance, with better performing institutions paying
higher salaries, we find limited evidence that this relationship is causal; that is, we find no statistically
significant link that a change in pay leads to a change in performance, or vice-versa. Instead, we find
strong support for an asymmetric benchmarking behaviour, where those institutions with below average
pay increase their vice-chancellor’s salaries quicker than those with above average pay. We simulate a
model whereby different institutions target different places of the distribution of salaries and demonstrate
that inflation of pay can be explained by this behaviour.
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Non-Technical Summary  
 
The pay of university vice-chancellors (VC) in the UK has caused a strong debate in 
the press recently leading to some VCs having to resign.  
 
Academics protest that at a difficult time for UK academia caused by the insecurity 
faced in the outset of Brexit, the gap between VC and staff pay is increasing. 
Students claim that at a time when tuition fees are increasing and they are 
accumulating high levels of debt the increase in VC¶s pay is unacceptable. 
Remuneration committees of universities however, argue that the increase is 
justified giving the VCs outstanding performance, especially during these turbulent 
times. 
 
The present study analyses the relationship between performance and pay using 
established econometric models and ample empirical evidence from UK academia. 
It uses a dataset consisting of 154 universities in the UK over a period of ten years 
and a comprehensive set of key performance indicators related to both student 
numbers and student evaluations of the university (league tables) as well as its 
research and funding performance. 
 
The key result of the study is that even though there is a correlation between pay and 
performance it is not causal and therefore, a better performance of the VCs is not 
what causes a higher pay. It is much rather a benchmarking behaviour where those 
universities with below average pay increase their VC pay quicker than those with 
above average pay.  
 
µKeeping up with VC JoQHV¶ is what seems to explain the recent inflation of VC pay, 
rather than their good performance. 
 
1 Introduction
The salaries of university directors in the UK (called vice chancellors, henceforth ‘VC’) have been under
severe scrutiny recently. The VCs of two Universities (the University of Bath and Bath Spa University) have
resigned in 2017 after receiving criticism for excessive pay. Attention is now subsequently focused on the pay
of other VCs in the UK. Academics protest that at a time when student numbers are decreasing in the outset
of Brexit, and academic jobs are reduced, the ratio between VC and staff pay is increasing, with VCs at some
institutions earning 12 times more than academic staff and 35 times more than the average workers in the
local area (Bennett 2017). Students and their representatives complain that this is unacceptable at a time
with accumulation of high debts due to increased tuition fees.1 As a consequence, the payment agreements
of VCs have been called under investigation by the university regulator, the Office for Students, and the
universities minister has called on universities to restrain pay for senior management.
Remuneration committees of the University of Bath and Bath Spa University argue, however, that the
performance of their VCs was outstanding during a turbulent time for UK higher education and that the
institutions have been flourishing during their tenure; therefore, their salaries reflected ‘value for money’.
Other parties highlight that it is problematic to compare average academic pay with that of VCs as the
latter are recruited in ‘a distinctive labour market’ which ‘doesn’t operate under the same rules as those that
apply to other - even senior academics’. It is further argued that if a VC is tackling ‘much more important’
issues such as the pay and conditions of early career academics, or those on teaching-only, research-only or
other part-time and fixed-term contracts, then they ‘deserve to be well remunerated’.2 This suggestes that
if pay is tied to performance of the VCs, their high salaries are justified.
The present study analyses the relationship between university performance and VC pay in the UK
higher education sector. It does this by using a comprehensive dataset including 154 universities in the UK
over ten years (between 2007 and 2016) and a comprehensive set of key performance indicators. Although
several articles have extensively discussed the VC-pay situation in the UK and presented comprehensive
statistics related to it, to our knowledge, no other study has analysed the pay-performance relationship as
comprehensively, attempting to determine the direction of causation (Baker 2017, Bennett 2017, Langdon &
Leino 2017). Moreover, the present study complements the existing ‘classical models’ in labour economics
explaining the relationship between pay and performance with a salary ‘benchmarking model’ (DiPrete et.
al, 2010; Faulkender & Yang, 2010).
Our results provide more support for benchmarking behaviour leading to increased VC pay than perfor-
mance based explanations; in this respect, our findings are in line with Faulkender & Yang (2010). Although
we find evidence of a correlation between pay and performance, there is no statistically significant link be-
tween a change in pay being associated with a change in performance. That is, high performing institutions
pay higher salaries to their chief executive, but changes in either pay or performance is not associated with
changes in the other. We provide evidence of an asymmetric benchmarking behaviour whereby those insti-
tutions paying their VC below the average of their peers, increase pay relative to this average faster than
those universities paying above the average. This is in line with literature which suggests that remuneration
committees setting salaries benchmark against higher paying institutions Nagel (2007), Faulkender & Yang
(2010), Bizjak et al. (2011). Our results suggest that 64% of the variance explaining pay changes is explained
1BBC News 7 December 2017 available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-42260090
2William Locke, director of the Centre for Higher Education Studies at UCL Institute of Education.
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by this benchmarking-to-average behaviour, but that this figure is 71% for those paying below the average,
and only 25% above the average. We build a theoretical models to reconcile these empirical results and
past literature and demonstrate that this asymmetric benchmarking behaviour can explain inflation in chief
executive salaries in UK universities well.
The rest of the paper is organised as the following. Section 2 outlines the pay and performance as well as
the salary benchmarking literature. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics on our underlying dataset of 154
UK institutions over the past ten years. Section 4 presents empirical results whilst testing the relationship
between pay and performance, and Section 5 presents both empirical evidence and theoretical simulations
for benchmarking behaviour. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background and related literature
The literature on the pay-performance relationship distinguishes between the influence of performance on
pay and the influence of pay on performance (see Devers et al. 2007, for a comprehensive review). The
distinction is important in order to determine if a better performance leads to a better pay or if rather a
better pay motivates individuals into a better performance. This is further important for formulation of the
main hypotheses to be tested in our study:
2.1 H1: A high pay is the result of a good performance
Studies analyzing the pay-performance relationship usually come from finance and researchers examining
the influence of performance on executive pay by depicting compensation as a reward for prior performance
(Fama 1980).3 Often this concept is related to the notions of ‘Principal-Agent’ of ‘Agency Theory’. The
general idea being that the stockholders (the ‘Principals’) hire one or more executive officers (the ‘Agents’)
to maximise their wealth (shares value). The ‘Principals’ try to incentivise their ‘Agents’ by tying their
pay to (stock) performance in various ways (bonuses or other forms of compensation). Researchers refer
to the effect that performance has on pay as the sensitivity of pay to performance and maybe the most
famous study in this area is by Jensen & Murphy (1990). The authors show that an increase of $1,000 in
shareholder wealth (as a measure for CEO performance) translates into a compensation of ‘just’ $3.25 (pay)
maybe suggesting that the interests of the ‘Principals’ and the ‘Agents’ are not well aligned or may even
conflict. The benchmark specification used in Jensen & Murphy (1990) is the following:
∆Xi,t = α+ β∆ ln (Yi,t) + εi,t (1)
where Yi,t is the measure for performance (shareholder wealth), Xi,t is the measure for pay (CEO salary plus
bonus) and ∆ stands for change (Jensen & Murphy 1990, p.228). Therefore, VC’s change in compensation
is explained by a change in the performance of the University. In an attempt to gauge causation a lagged
performance term is additionally introduced in equation (1) above (Jensen & Murphy 1990, p.230).
3Note that the pay of VCs is often compared to the ones of chief executives of private companies. Turnover in some high
profile universties is £600 million or more Fearn (2009).
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∆Xi,t = α+ β1∆ ln (Yi,t) + β2∆ ln (Yi,t−1) + εi,t (2)
Various controls and measures are added to (1) and (2) and other measures for pay and performance are
tested. The benchmark result is that the pay-performance sensitivity is small and decreasing over time.
Performance does not seem to have a strong impact on pay in the top management of a large sample of
financial companies in the US spanning five decades and, even though bonuses represent 50 percent of
CEO salary, they seem to be awarded in ways that are not highly sensitive to performance. Moreover, the
variability of CEO compensations form year to year is very low. The authors conclude that political forces
operating both in the public sector and inside organizations limit large payoffs for exceptional performance
and that the abscence of management incentives in public corporations is a puzzle. In this seminal study
the ‘pay-for-performance’ hypothesis seems to find little empirical support.
2.2 H2: A good performance is the result of high pay
The idea that pay influences performance is closely related to the ‘efficiency wages hypothesis’. This hy-
pothesis argues that if agents/employees are paid more than the market-clearing wage their efficiency will be
increased and this efficiency will lead to higher productivity which will pay for the higher wages. At the same
time, because agents will want to keep their high wages, costs associated with turnover will be reduced and
this will also pay for the higher wages. The idea being that that higher wages may increase the efficiency of
the agents/employees by various channels making it worthwhile for the principals/employers to offer wages
that exceed a market-clearing level. This hypothesis goes back at least to Marshall (1890) and found initially
empirical support in the car industry. Raff & Summers (1987) showed that the introduction of a generous
pay scheme (the ‘five dollar a day’) in 1914 has lead to substantial productivity benefits and profits for Ford.
Hanlon et al. (2003) using a large sample of 1,069 firms show that a higher pay offered to top executive in
form of option grant value, lead to higher operating income. Specifically, they found that $1.00 of option
grant value was associated with approximately $3.71 of future undiscounted operating income growth over
the 5 years following the grants. The empirical specification used in this study is basically the following:







2 + Zi,t + εi,t (3)
where Yi,t stands for operating income as a measure of performance, Xi,t−k stands for the grants received by
executives in the previous 5 years as a measure for increased pay and Zi,t is a set of controls. The term Xi,t−k
is introduced also at the power of two in order to allow for non-linearities. To give another example, Kato
et al. (2005) examined the adoption of stock-option compensation by Japanese firms following a regulatory
change in 1997 that permitted their use. They found abnormal returns of 2% around announcement dates
and increased operating performance post-adoption. Banker et al. (1996) argued that increased performance
resulting from the adoption of incentive pay plans derives from self-selection and effort. Results showed that
capable employees seek out jobs where superior skills are rewarded; thus, they are drawn to jobs with greater
levels of incentive pay. The empirical specification used is:
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Di,s + εi,t (4)
where Yi,t are the sales of employee i at time t as a measure for performance, Xi,t,p are the various incentive
plans to which the employee is subjected to and Di,s summarizes a set of dummies which represent store,
merchandise group, if the employer is temporary employed or not etc. The basic idea being that pay
influences performance.4
In an effort to accommodate both directions of causation (performance → pay and pay → performance),
MacLeod & Malcomson (1998) develop a theoretical model that explains the relationship between pay and
performance depending on market conditions. Provided there is sufficient rent from employment, firms may
use either efficiency wages (high wages combined with the threat of dismissal) or performance pay (workers
paid an end-of-period bonus if their subjectively assessed performance is satisfactory) to motivate employees.
If the number of jobs (J) in an industry is larger than the number of workers in that industry (L) then bonuses
have to be paid for good performance, or else workers would easily move to another job with a higher pay.
Since workers can always get another job, they will shirk unless there is a bonus to compensate them for the
disutility of work. This leads to a ‘pay for performance’ equilibrium (hypothesis H1), called ‘performance
pay equilibria’ in their study. Efficiency wages would not work in this case as the workers would shirk and
change jobs. If on the contrary, the number of jobs is less than the number of workers (J < L) and the
cost of creating a job is sufficiently high, then in order to keep high quality workers, employers will have
to pay wages above the average market rate, and an ‘efficiency wages equilibria’ (hypothesis H2) is more
efficient. MacLeod & Malcomson (1998) apply their model to a two sector economy where one sector is
‘capital intensive’ and the other is ‘labour intensive’. The authors claim that the essential characteristics of
capital-intensive jobs is that they have higher productivity and that there is a sunk cost to creating vacancies
that cannot be recouped if the vacancy is not filled. They argue that this description fits with the Ford’s
$5-day example in Raff & Summers (1987) and with the ‘efficiency wages hypothesis’. It is precisely the
cost of not having each position filled at all times that makes it efficient in the model for the market to
allocate a higher wage. This ‘efficiency wage’ will then ensure that the post does not remain unfilled for a
long period of time. One result from the analysis is that while efficiency wage equilibria have unemployment,
performance pay equilibria do not. Therefore, if the unemployment rate for an occupation is low (J > L),
then the use of bonuses or other forms of compensations for performance should be observed, while in a
high unemployment environment where J < L, efficiency wages should be observed. Arguably, the number
of vice chancellor jobs in the UK is scarce and J < L; therefore, according to the MacLeod & Malcomson
(1998) model we should rather find empirical evidence for the ‘efficiency wage hypothesis’ where a better
performance is the result of higher pay (hypothesis H2) than vice-versa (hypothesis H1).
4There are serveral reasons why paying above the market salary might not be an inefficient outcome such as: monitoring,
turnover, motivation, and many other. This may be the reason why evidence from other sectors than finance tests some of the
suggested outcomes/implications/hypotheses of efficiency wages, rather than the whole model itself.
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2.3 Benchmarking
We complement the two models described above with a consideration of pay ‘benchmarking’ (whereby the
pay of an individual is set in the context of those deemed to be the individual’s peers), which has received
recent attention in the literature. DiPrete et al. (2010) construct a hypothesis that benchmarking behaviours
of CEO pay lead to a ratcheting (a significant increase beyond that which would be expected) of pay since
the 1990s. They propose that through selective sampling of a benchmark group, a powerful rent seeking
executive can consistently get pay rises to push remuneration into the upper tail of the distribution. This
power of certain CEOs has an externality effect as it pushes up average remuneration, which can be used
by those CEOs with less power; the impact of those with the ability to leapfrog has an inflationary effect
for everyone else in the market. In many ways, these leapfroggers provide an asymmetric benchmarking
behaviour, certain members of the distribution are using different distributions from which to benchmark.
Indeed, Schmidt & Dworschak (2006) use the prevalence of benchmarking in pay negotiations in the UK
to explain why wage inflation has been higher than that of Germany, despite higher German trade union
power.
Faulkender & Yang (2010) present results to suggest that the median salary of benchmarked companies
explains more of the variation in CEO pay than all other attributes, including performance and the size
of the firm; that is, the salaries of those in the group against which CEO pay is benchmarked is the most
important element determining executive pay. Further, Faulkender & Yang (2010) find that after controlling
for other characteristics (such as industry and size) a CEO with a higher salary is more likely to be selected
for a benchmarking group by the remuneration committee of particular organisation; that is, committees
are more inclined to have higher paid CEOs in their group with which to compare their own executives.
Bizjak et al. (2011) too find that the selection of CEOs for comparison by a remuneration committee is
biased in such a way to ensure that higher pay raises can be justified. Faulkender & Yang (2012) find that
this benchmark group manipulation - whereby remuneration committees deliberately target firms with high
executive pay in order to justify paying likewise - increased since 2006, when the US legislated that firms
pre-announce the companies against they will benchmark pay. Laschever (2013) use data from S&P900 firms
in 2007 and 2008 to demonstrate that, controlling for other characteristics, remunerations committees are
more likely to chose higher CEO-compensating firms for benchmarking purposes; moreover, remuneration
committees are more likely to chose larger firms for benchmarks, holding all else constant. Further Laschever
(2013) apply an instrumental variable strategy to estimate an elasticity of CEO compensation with respect
to the benchmark group average pay of 0.5.
Nagel (2007) finds evidence that those firms who underpay their CEO relative to the market increase
their pay in order to reduce this inequality; as such, the growth rate of the median CEO salary has increased
above inflation due to transparency of pay. Although Nagel (2007) does not specifically address asymmetries
in the benchmarking process, it is found that whereas the number of underpaid CEOs has decreased since
the 1970s, those CEOs who are overpaid have not; the interpretation given is that whereas frugal executive
boards correct underpayment but do not overcorrect, those paying high salaries do not regress downwards.
When asked about pay benchmarking for CEOs, remuneration committees and boards provide arithmeti-
cally challenging results. For example, 35% of the firms surveyed in Crystal (1992) stated that they aimed
to be at the 75th percentile, and 65% at the 50th percentile. Bizjak et al. (2008) used proxy statements to
identify that 73% of sampled S&P 500 firms target the mean or median of CEO pay distribution; in the
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appendix of Faulkender & Yang (2010), it is illustrated that 98% of boards target a minimum of the prior
year CEO peers’ median pay. Bizjak et al. (2008) find that CEO turnover is less in companies which pay
more than the median salary, whereas Nagel (2007) find that those companies who pay below the average
executive salary perform worse. The literature suggests that there is a push for an arithmetically impossible
number of CEOs to be paid above average.
Bizjak et al. (2008) document that a majority of companies whose CEOs receive below average pay
receive increases, and this proportion increases with the performance of the company; that is, if a CEO has
below average pay, they are more likely to receive a large pay increase, and this is more likely when the
performance of the firm is strong. Bizjak et al. (2008) find that approximately a third of all CEOs with
below average pay receive increases which take them above average each year.
Moreover, Garvey & Milbourn (2006) find an asymmetry in the pay of executive pay with respect to luck;
that is, CEOs will be rewarded for good luck, but will not be punished for bad luck. Having consider the
theoretical and empirical literature on executive pay, we now turn to testing these results on date from UK
university VCs.
3 Descriptive statistics
3.1 Measures of pay
Since the academic year 2006/07 Times Higher Education have compiled data on the pay of vice-chancellors
of UK institutions. This data has included details on salary, pensions and benefits, and has further included
data on academic staff pay (separated by professor and non-professor and by gender). Table 1 highlights
descriptive statistics on pay, where total remuneration (including salary, pension and other benefits) is in-
cluded as our benchmark measure.5 We adjust for inflation using a GDP deflator for the UK and all values
are in 2017 prices. To give a perspective on the size of the student market during this period, total first year
first degree acceptances are also provided in the second column.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on pay and ‘performance’
Year end Students acceptances VC pay Academic pay
2007 413,400 235,311 47,829
2008 456,640 256,912 48,287
2009 481,850 277,915 51,430
2010 487,310 275,196 51,462
2011 492,010 267,702 50,526
2012 464,770 265,267 49,553
2013 495,540 266,778 49,083
2014 512,340 271,357 48,866
2015 532,225 283,888 49,496
Descriptive statistics illustrating: the cycle year end in the first column; the number of students accepted, the mean average
vice-chancellor pay; and the mean average academic pay. Wages are reported at December 2017 prices.
5Approximately 12% of total pay is received by vice-chancellors in pensions, and this fraction is stable throughout the sample
period.
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During the sample period, student numbers increased by 29% whereas the real pay of vice-chancellors
increases by 41% compared to 3% real pay increases in academic staff (and 3.4% specifically for professors).
It is also possible to discern that there are falls in real pay of both vice-chancellor and academics after the
financial crash, but whereas academic pay was at its peak in 2009/2010, the pay of vice-chancellors has seen
an upward trend since 2013, and remuneration is at its highest in the most recent figures. Moreover, staff
pay fell four consecutive years after the crisis (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), while VC pay fell only in 2011 and
2012 after which it started to increase again.
Given that the regulation of the higher education sector is different for different countries of the UK,
the distribution of pay across these geographical lines may differ. From Table 2 one can see that the vice-
chancellors and academics of Wales have had the best outcomes with respect to growth in pay but the worst
outcomes with respect to growth in student acceptances. These pay changes bring Welsh averages up to
the average for the UK; in 2007, Welsh VCs and academics received 80.0% and 93.0% of the UK average,
respectively, whereas in 2015 these fractions were 103.5% and 95.8%.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on pay and ‘performance’ by country
Student acceptances VC pay Academic pay
UK 29.45% 20.87% 3.49%
England 28.19% 21.09% 3.59%
Northern Ireland 11.31% 7.73% 4.26%
Scotland 32.51% 17.79% 2.16%
Wales 6.46% 56.27% 6.63%
Descriptive statistics illustrating: the specific country of the UK in the first column; the number of student acceptances, the
percentage increase in the mean average vice-chancellor pay; and the percentage increase in the mean average academic pay.
Wages reported at December 2016 prices.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of real total salary and pension pay for vice chancellors: the minimum
value (£11k) is for Heythorp College (University of London) in 2011 and the maximum (£669k) for the
University of Southampton in 2016. In the case of the former, there is no discussion in the original source
as to why this is so low, and the observation is dropped from future analysis. In the case of the latter,
there was a change in the VC during the year and £253,000 of the total represents compensation for loss of
office. A dummy variable for if there was a change in vice-chancellor during the year will be included in the
regression analysis; on average we observe a 13% rate for annual change in vice-chancellor in our sample.
Further, to ensure that pay outliers do not have overdue weight in the regression analysis, the variable will
be transformed using a natural logarithm. Beyond these two outliers, there is a slight positive skew in the
data, and it is possible to observe that there is a large degree of variability in pay. The positive skew suggests
that the data has rather a lower bound than an upper bound.
Of the remaining variables related specifically to the vice-chancellor, we report that on average vice-
chancellors have spent 5.92 years in their current position; this result reconciles with those from the Hillman
(2016) which suggest that current tenure of UK VCs is between five and seven years. Finally, we report
that only 17% of observations have a female vice-chancellor. This number has increased with time, with
the figure being 13% in 2007 and 21% in 2016. If one compares salary by gender throughout the sample,
females receive lower salaries by £12k (4.7% of total salaries, with a p-value of 0.010 on a bivariate t-test
of statistical significance assuming unequal variances) and have been in post for half a year less than their
8
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Histogram presenting results for the distribution of real salaries and pensions of vice-chancellors.
male counter-parts (with associated p-value of 0.075).
3.2 Measures of performance
For our benchmark results, we use six measures of university performance, encompassing different elements
of the business. These performance measures come in the form of: student numbers and competition for
places; league table performance; and research.
3.2.1 Student numbers and competition for places
Students represent a substantial revenue flow for universities. Thus one of our measures of performance is
the number of students accepted to study at an institution in a given year. In additional to this, we also
look at the number of applications to study a university has received from potential candidates. Until 2015
student numbers for each course were capped by the UK government for UK and EU applicants. Measuring
the number of applications allows for a measure of performance which considers the popularity to study at
an institution beyond these student caps. Finally, as historically larger institutions are likely to have more
applications and acceptances, we derive a measure of performance of applications-per-place which represents
relative demand for an institution. This measure considers how sought after a specific institution. Data on
applications and acceptances is available from the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) for
students applying to their first undergraduate degree. This is the system through which all UK and EU
students apply for their degree and each student has the ability to apply for five courses on an application.
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3.2.2 League tables
The second set of measures of performance come from university league tables produced annually within the
UK. These take into consideration different attributes with respect to teaching and research at an institution
and provide an overall score and ranking for each university. Although there are many university league
tables in the UK, we focus on those which have been published over our sample period and which are
freely available; this leaves those published by the Guardian Newspaper and the Complete University Guide
(CUG). For each league table, we obtain data on all individual attributes which make up the final overall
score; however, as a benchmark level of performance we focus on the overall score achieved in the assessment
which subsequently leads to league table ranking.6
3.2.3 Research
The most popular metric with which to measure the research performance of UK institutions through scores
received from nationally conducted ‘research excellent reviews’.7 Not only is this the measure of research
to which the most time, effort and finances are allocated, it is also one which is associated with substantial
funding through (indirectly) the UK government. Over our sample we have three periods of research ex-
cellence scores: pre-December 2008, between 2009 and 2014, and post-2014 (there were research excellence
assessments in 2001, 2008 and 2014). As this measure is not updated annually, when comparing research
excellence scores across institutions we split out sample into three time periods: before 2008; 2008 - 2014;
and after 2014. In each period, the research score is that provided by the assessments, and for all over
variables we take the within period average of the annual data we have obtained.
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents correlation coefficients across our six benchmark measures of performance as well as (in
the final column) a measure of correlation between a variable and the lag of itself (to show the relative
persistence of these performance measures). In general there are high degrees of correlation between our
performance measures (note that larger scores in each of our performance measures suggest better outcomes
for an institution), with only the correlation coefficient between first year acceptances and the score in the
Guardian league table having a p-value > 0.05. In general, universities with high league table rankings have
also higher research quality assessment scores (with correlation coefficients of 0.790 and 0.690 depending on
which league table is applied); they also have more demand per place (correlation coefficients of 0.510 and
0.479) and more applications.
Maybe not surprisingly, there is also a high degree of persistence in a specific performance measure, with
large correlation coefficients between a variable and its lag; this is measured in the final column of Table 3.
For all measures, there is a strong correlation from one period to the next suggesting relatively consistent
6Although the methodology of the league tables change, as of 2017 both tables in our dataset use qualifications on entry,
student feedback (administered centrally in the UK, known as the ‘National Student Survey’ or the ‘NSS’), employability,
student spend and staff-to-student ratios in their aggregate measure. In addition to this, the Complete University Guide use
measures of research excellence and intensity, completion rates, and graduation grades. The Guardian league table, on the
other hand, use a measure of ‘value added’ above those listed above, which evaluates the grades achieved of graduates against
the qualifications with which those students entered the institution.
7Before 2014, these reviews were known as ‘Research Excellence Assessment’, or REA, and since 2014 these have been
performed under the ‘Research Excellence Framework’, or ‘REF’.
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Table 3: Correlation between performance measures
Applications Acceptances AccAppRatio CUG Guardian REF Lagged
Applications 1 0.994
(0.000)
Acceptances 0.952 1 0.99
(0.000) (0.000)
AccAppRatio 0.222 0.135 1 0.741
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CUG 0.324 0.089 0.523 1 0.977
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Guardian 0.265 0.062 0.493 0.916 1 0.950
(0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
REF 0.408 0.239 0.486 0.808 0.689 1 0.772
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correlation coefficients between performance measures. The final column represents the correlation between a performance
variable and its lagged value which gives the persistence of a variable. P-values in parentheses.
levels of performance from institutions. One can observe, for example, that there is an extremely high
persistence in league table scores, with correlation coefficients of 0.980 and 0.950 depending on the table.
We perform both Harris-Tzavalis and Levin-Lin-Chu tests for unit roots in both performance and pay
variables.8 With the exception of applications the null hypothesis of a unit root is strongly rejected. In the
analysis below, we apply empirical specifications including both the level and change in variables to account
for any unit root issues. Further descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix in Tables A1 - A9.
4 Association between pay and performance
4.1 Empirical specifications
Hypothesis 1 above states that pay is a result of performance. To test for this relationship, we estimate the
following specification:
ln (X1,i,t) = α+ β1 ln(Yi,t) + β2 ln(Yi,t−1) + γV Ci,t + δZi,t + εi,t (5)
where X1,i,t is the pay of the V C of university i at time t, V Ci,t is a set of variables related to the vice-
chancellor of university i in period t including both their gender, their year in service, and whether the VC
was new in the year of question; and Zi,t are a set of other control variables including the geographical
location of the university (separated between England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales), time period
dummy variables, and the group of universities the institution belongs (for example, the Russel Group).9
The variable Yi,t represents performance of institution i at time t, which given the levels of collinearity (see
Table 3), we enter into estimations of 5 one at a time; as discussed above, we use the number of student
applications, the number of student acceptances, the ratio between the two, the two university league tables
(the Complete University Guide and Guardian League Table), and the research performance as assessed
8Note that both the Harris-Tzavalis and Levin-Lin-Chu tests account for the panel nature of the time series.
9An association of UK universities regarded as having the highest academic standards.
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by the Research Excellence Framework (REF). For our benchmark results, we only include one lag of the
performance variables in our specifications; sensitivity of the results to this assumption is performed in
Section 4.5. The inclusion of lags is meant to try to detect Granger type causation. If past university
performance should impact significantly on today’s VC pay then a potential causation from performance to
pay can be assumed.10
In order to further investigate the potential causal relationship between VC pay and performance, the
following additional difference in differnce specification will be estimated:
∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] = α+ β∆ [ln (Yi,t)] + γV Ci,t + δZi,t + εi,t (6)
where ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] is the change in VC pay from previous year, and ∆ [ln (Yi,t)] the change in performance
from the previous year (and all the other variables are as above). As illustrated in Table 3 there is a high
degree in persistence of the performance of a university; that is, a good university one year is very likely to
maintain this level of performance. Through estimating specification (6) we are assessing whether changes
in performance are associated with changes in pay. This can provide more conclusive evidence of causality
compared to the specification in the levels of pay and performance (5).
To assess hypothesis 2 (that performance is a result of high pay) we estimate the following two specifica-
tions:
Yi,t = α+ β1 ln (X1,i,t) + β2 ln (X1,i,t−1) + λ ln (X2,i,t) + γV Ci,t + δZi,t + εi,t (7)
∆ ln (Y1,i,t) = α+ β1∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] + β2∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] + λ1∆ [ln (X2,i,t)]
+λ2∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] + γV Ci,t + δZi,t + εi,t (8)
where X2,i,t represents academic staff pay.
4.2 Empirical Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the main results for the empirical specifications outlined above. Full regression results
including all controls can be found in Tables A10 and A11 in the Appendix. Table 4 presents the results
for hypothesis H1 which stipulates that performance influences pay. The dependent variable is VCs pay and
the performance measures are as described above.
Focusing on the results from specification (5) from Table 4, there is a statistically significant association
between contemporaneous higher performance and higher pay for applications, acceptances, and scores in
the REF; higher performance is associated with higher pay in the same period. For league table scores,
statistically significance is associated with lagged performance, that is, better performance in the previous
period leads to higher pay this period. This result could come from directional causality (pay decisions
respond to better previous performance) or due to the nature of league tables, being composite measures
of prior performance. It is also possible to conclude that the estimates suggest that improvements in the
research scores of an institution having higher impact on VC pay than other performance indicators. It
is estimated that a 10% improve in REF leads to a 4.8% increase in pay, compared with similar improves
10Even though Granger causality is not a guarantee for true causality.
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Table 4: The impact of performance on pay
Specification (5): Dependent variable ln (X1,i,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln(Yi,t) 0.528*** 0.193*** 0.025 0.093 0.046 0.488***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.668) (0.346) (0.613) (0.000)
ln(Yi,t−1) -0.391*** -0.052 0.000 0.205** 0.187** 0.008
(0.000) (0.328) (0.996) (0.034) (0.041) (0.883)
n 1,219 1,218 1,218 925 717 213
R
2 0.469 0.464 0.323 0.357 0.391 0.439
Specification (6): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
∆ [ln (Yi,t)] -0.039 -0.033 0.010 -0.104 0.001 -0.192
(0.331) (0.372) (0.766) (0.273) (0.986) (0.338)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−1)] 0.065 0.016 0.018 0.081 0.076 -0.066
(0.150) (0.662) (0.601) (0.322) (0.301) (0.426)
n 1064 1063 1063 792 591 97
R
2 0.079 0.077 0.077 0.07 0.064 0.194
Regressions from specifications (5) and (6) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Results for all coefficients can be
found in Table A10.
in other performance variables leading to approximately a 2% increase in pay (with the exception of the
application to acceptances ratio which is not estimated to be important for determining pay).
The results from specification (6) in Table 4 are never statistically significant which suggests that im-
provements in performance do not lead to a higher pay and that the relationship between performance and
pay is not causal. That is, there is a correlation between performance and pay (as illustrated by the results
from specification (5)) but that changes in performance are not correlated to change in pay (as illustrated
by the results from specification (6)). These results imply that higher performing institutions pay their VC
a higher salary, but that were performance to improve (reduce), higher (lower) pay does not follow.
Table 5 presents the results for testing the second hypothesis (H2) suggesting that pay may impact on
performance, presenting results both for VC pay (X1) and for staff pay (X2). The results are similar to those
from Table 4. Focusing on specification (7), there is a statistically significant association between contempo-
raneous VC pay and performance in applications, student acceptances and REF scores. Interestingly, there
is now more of an association between lagged pay and performance, with larger coefficients and statistically
significant results for all performance variables with the exception of the applications-per-place ratio. These
results suggest that higher VC pay in previous periods lead to higher student applications, acceptances,
league table and REF results today; this result (and its consistency across different performance measures)
suggesting some evidence for the ‘efficiency wages’ hypothesis. A 10% increase in pay is estimated to increase
applications and acceptances by over 15.4%, improve league table scores by 12% and research quality by
2.9%.
Although there appears to be strong evidence for correlation there limited evidence that a change in pay
leads to a change in performance. Focusing on results from specification (8) in Table 4, there is estimated
to be a limited link between a change in pay and change in performance; indeed, the two places where
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Table 5: The impact of pay on performance
Specification (7): Dependent variable ln (Yi,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln (X1,i,t) 0.680*** 0.676*** 0.024 0.051 0.044 0.159***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.784) (0.187) (0.331) (0.009)
ln (X1,i,t−1) 0.894*** 0.964*** -0.048 0.122*** 0.120** 0.132**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.596) (0.003) (0.012) (0.045)
ln (X2,i,t) -1.089 -2.513*** 1.416*** -0.193 -0.302 -0.073
(0.285) (0.008) (0.001) (0.325) (0.299) (0.770)
ln (X2,i,t−1) 1.142 1.709* -0.544 0.043 -0.246 0.539**
(0.253) (0.066) (0.191) (0.821) (0.408) (0.037)
n 783 782 782 686 585 224
R
2 0.494 0.467 0.279 0.765 0.643 0.716
Specification (8): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (Yi,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] -0.024 -0.046 0.015 -0.036* -0.002 -0.053
(0.582) (0.291) (0.738) (0.094) (0.963) (0.419)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] -0.022 0.046 -0.072* 0.011 0.021 -0.026
(0.591) (0.258) (0.097) (0.580) (0.462) (0.757)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t)] 0.321 0.257 0.109 0.003 0.019 -0.196
(0.154) (0.241) (0.642) (0.977) (0.924) (0.573)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] -0.176 0.017 -0.075 -0.201** -0.152 -0.529
(0.322) (0.920) (0.687) (0.027) (0.392) (0.094)
n 577 576 576 506 405 104
R
2 0.191 0.075 0.193 0.164 0.181 0.26
Regressions from specifications (7) and (8) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the pay variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported in
parentheses underneath. Results for all coefficients can be found in Table A11.
there is a statistically significant result in changes in VC pay impacting changes in performance (albeit
significant only at 10%), the estimated coefficient is with the unexpected sign with higher pay leading
to lower performance. Results from both specifications (5) and (8) suggest that there is no statistically
significant consistent relationship between academic pay and performance (in levels or changes).
4.3 What explains pay?
Table A10 in the appendix presents full regression results with VC pay as the dependent variable. If there has
been a change in VC, overall remuneration is higher reflecting the fact that there may be an overlap between
two VCs (therefore increasing the cost to the institution - note the variable for VC pay is to total cost to the
institution which may include pay for more than one individual in the year) and any additional pay which
may come at the termination/ending of a contract. Moreover, the longer a VC has been in post, the more
pay they receive, all other things being equal. Although each specification predicts that being female means
that a VC is paid less, this is only once statistically significant at the 10% level. Holding all else constant,
there is evidence to suggest that VCs of Scottish institutions get paid more and those in Northern Irish
institutions less (compared to the benchmark of England).11 Further, an institution’s affiliation to a specific
university-group can effect salaries with the highest paying institutions are in the Russell Group, holding all
11This might seem surprizing as Scottish Universities do not charge fees to Scottish students.
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else constant. In each case, these correlations are present when looking at the levels of pay (specification
(5)) but are not present when looking at changes in pay (specification (6)) suggesting a lack of causation.
4.4 What explains performance?
Similarly, Table A11 in the appendix presents full regression results with performance as the dependent vari-
able. A VC being in post for longer is correlated with better performance, although this is only statistically
significant for applications, and the applications-per-place ratio; a change in VC is not correlated with either
better or worse performance. Institutions with a female VC are statistically significantly associated with
lower applications and acceptances of students, but are strongly statistically significantly associated with
better league table performance. Note again that these results are only present when looking at the levels of
performance (specification (7)) and not changes (specification (8)); therefore, we interpret this to be a signal
that female VCs are employed by institutions with lower student numbers, holding all else constant.
4.5 Sensitivity
We have subjected the above results to a number of different sensitivity checks, the results for which are
presented in Tables A12 to A19. Including more lags of either performance (Table A12) or pay (Table A13)
provides similar results to those presented above. As there is a high degree of correlation in both pay and
performance (see Table 3), including more lags of these variables increases multicollinearity and therefore
weakens statistical significance of the impact of performance on pay and vice-versa, but the key intuition from
the benchmark specifications are maintained. When we test for the optimal number of lags in specifications
(looking at the adjusted-R2 coefficient) we find that the one lag (as presented above) consistently outperforms
alternatives. However, looking at higher lags is important as decision making in universtieies is very long
term and changes might happen slowely.
When estimating the above specifications using a fixed effect panel (Tables A14 and A15) similar results
as from specifications (6) and (8) are produced. A fixed effects panel is in effect looking at the impact at
an institutional level, looking at what would happen to pay if performance changed, and vice-versa. In this
respect these fixed effects results resemble those from specifications (6) and (8). When applying random
effects panel regressions (Tables A16 and A17) results are in line with the benchmark from Tables 4 and
5. This process is using variation across institutions and is therefore akin to the estimations when pooling
together the data.
We also consider looking over longer time horizons than the one year analysis performed in the benchmark.
For this, we take average values over the independent and dependent variables for two, three and four years
and run the same regressions as those performed in the benchmark; results for three year time horizons
are presented in Tables A18 and A19. Again, results are similar to those presented above, with many
correlations between the levels of pay and performance, but limited associations between changes in one
leading to changes in another. Similar to Table 5, this process also finds that lagged VC pay can have a
positive impact on present performance.12
12We have also considered estimations of specifications (7) and (8) now including all annual performance measures simulta-
neously; note that this excludes REF scores (which are not annual) and applications be per place, which when logged would
be perfectly collinear with the log of applications and places. In levels, first year student acceptances are more associated
with higher pay than applications, and the CUG league table more than the Guardian league table. Similar to the benchmark
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Overall, the results seem to support rather a relationship going from pay to performance than the other
way round, as more coefficients are significant in the frist part of Table 5 than in the first part of Table
4. Therefore, results seem to support for the ‘efficiency wages hypothesis’ - as the model by MacLeod &
Malcomson (1998) would suggest in the case of a market where the number of jobs is lower than the number
of applicants (J < L). Howerer, the evidence does not seem to be compelling as almost no coefficient is
significant in the second part of these tables.13 Therefore, we will turn our attention to the results for the
benchmarking model.
5 Benchmarking
Although there is a correlation between performance and pay in the results above, with higher performing
institutions on average paying their VCs more, there is limited evidence of causality between these two
variables. We therefore look to other explanations to consider how pay for VCs is determined, and why the
rate of inflation in VC pay outstrips that of academic pay (Table 1).
When the data on VC and academic pay is published by the THE a corresponding article discussing the
results is also published. In these articles, university spokes-people are cited discussing and accounting for the
change in vice-chancellor pay. Reviewing these comments by universities, and codifying these by themes: 27%
of the responses discuss the pay of VCs in light of the performance of the institution; 20% justify high wages
through retention concerns; and 29% discuss complications of leaving VCs and having overlapping contracts
of incoming and outgoing chief executives. The most common explanation, although not a majority, are
the 36% of responses from university spokespeople citing benchmarking issues when setting vice-chancellor
pay.14 We therefore consider the role of benchmarking in the setting of vice-chancellor pay.
5.1 Asymmetric benchmarking
From the literature discussed in Section 2.3, it can be hypothesised that benchmarking is more of a concern
for those institutions who are currently below their target chief executive pay than above. For example, 35%
of the firms surveyed in Crystal (1992) stated that they aimed to be at the 75th percentile, and 65% at the
50th percentile, with similar results from Bizjak et al. (2008) and Faulkender & Yang (2010). Given these
proportions, it would be logical for those firms already at or above their target position in the distribution
of executive pay to feel less pressure to implement large pay rises. Further, the literature does not explicitly
discuss any firm which deliberately targets lower than average pay.
Therefore, one can hypothesise that benchmarking is an important factor in the setting VC pay, and that
benchmarking would be more of an issue for those in the bottom of the pay distribution (those with below
average VC pay) than those above. We consider this hypothesis, by estimating regressions of the following
form:






+ γZ ′t + εt (9)
results, there are no statistically significant changes in performance that are associated with changes in pay.
13And if they are significant, then with the wrong sing.
14Note that any given response from university spokespeople may reference more than one reason for changes and levels of
VC pay, and thus the total of all individual explanations adds to over 100%.
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which compares changes in current pay (∆X1,t) against the difference between lagged pay and the mean
from the industry (X1,t−1 − X¯1,t−1); where Zt are a set of control variables as in specifications from Section
4.1, with the inclusion of the size of the university proxied by the number of accepted students in the given
year.15 Specification (9) is estimated both without and with controls; and, for the whole sample, and pay in
the prior period was more (X1,t−1− X¯1,t−1 > 0) or less (X1,t−1− X¯1,t−1 < 0) than average; Table 6 presents
the results.
Table 6: Asymmetric bargaining model: regression results for VCs
All Below Ave Above Ave All Below Ave Above Ave
φ -0.110*** -0.445*** -0.003 -0.220*** -0.541*** -0.076***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.874) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
n 1132 522 610 1131 522 609
R2 0.049 0.155 0.000 0.165 0.295 0.151
Regression results for when specification (9) both without and with controls, and for the whole sample (‘All’), for when lagged
pay was below the lagged average (‘Below Ave’) and when it was above average (‘Above Ave’).
When estimating (9) on the whole sample, one can see a reversion to the mean with estimates of φ
from (9) of negative 0.110 and 0.220 for regressions without and with controls; this suggests that pay below
(above) the mean average this year will lead to higher (lower) pay in the subsequent year for the VC. When
estimating (9) on the sample with those below and above average pay, one can see that this reversion to
mean is asymmetric. Analysing the model including controls, the revision to mean for those below average
pay is estimated to be over seven times greater than the revision back for those above mean pay. In this
respect, the results suggest a stronger reversion to the mean from below than from above.
Table 7 presents similar results to those from Table 6, now considering more subsamples across the
distribution of VC pay. There is a strong revision to the mean for those in the top 10% of pay, and to
a lesser extent those in the bottom 10% of pay; this result is intuitive and represents regression to the
mean for outliers. For salaries between the 10th and 25th percentile, however, there is limited evidence of
benchmarking, with a statistically insignificant estimate of φ. The strongest reversion to the mean outside of
the top outliers are for those institutions paying salaries in the second quartile. This suggests that there is a
growing population chasing the average salary (those in the second quartile), but that there is a subsample
of institutions who consistently pay lower than average (between the 10th and the 25th percentile). For
those vice-chancellors with above average pay (but outside of the top 10%), the prior period average is not
a statistically significant determinant of their pay change this period.
Performing an analysis of variance (‘ANOVA’) from the specifications presented in Table 6 with control
variables and for the whole sample, it is estimated that 49% of the variance in annual real pay changes
explained by the model is attributable to the difference in prior pay compared to the prior mean of salaries;
of the remaining variables, 28% is explained by the year of the change, and 10% by the size of the institution.
Focusing on the specification only including those institutions below mean pay, 68% of the variance in annual
real pay changes explained by the model is attributable to the difference in prior pay compared to the prior
15Note that we did not include this size proxy into our analysis in Section 4 above, as the number of acceptances was taken
as a performance variable.
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Table 7: Asymmetric bargaining model: regression results for VCs
x < 10 10 < x < 25 25 < x < 50 50 < x < 75 75 < x < 90 90 > x
φ -0.253*** -0.071 -0.631*** -0.104 -0.088 -1.060***
(0.003) (0.610) (0.006) (0.565) (0.743) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 107 168 283 282 174 117
R2 0.513 0.223 0.192 0.203 0.197 0.706
Regression results for specification (9) estimated by percentile for institutions (‘x’) by salaries. Therefore, the first column
indicates the bottom 10% of real salaries, the second column between the 10th and 25th percentile, and so on.
mean of salaries; this compares to 8% for the specification including only those institutions with above average
pay. By including into (9) changes in performance variables, it is possibly to directly compare the importance
of performance and benchmarking in annual pay decisions; to do this, we include lagged changes in all annual
performance indicators in Section 4 (note this exclude scores from research assessment processes as these are
not performed annually). Looking at the whole sample, 64% of the explained sum of squares from the model
is attributable to our benchmarking variable compared with only 2% from performance variables; this split
is 71% and 2% respectively for the specification only including those institutions with lagged below average
pay, and 25% and 5% with lagged above average pay. It is clear, therefore, that benchmarks contributes
substantial more to VC pay changes than the performance of an institution, especially for those universities
with below average chief executive pay.
To test if this relationship is common in labour markets, and specifically to academia, we perform the
same methodology for academic pay; results are presented in Table A20. The results provide two key
observations: first, there is a skew in the distribution of academic staff pay, with 78% of institutions paying
below the mean average pay; and second, there is an asymmetry in benchmarking of pay, but the asymmetry
works against those above average. That is, those above average regress to the mean quicker than those
below average. This is the opposite of what happens to those vice-chancellors paid more than the average
salary for executive pay and suggests a very different relationship in the two labour markets.
5.2 Asymmetric benchmarking simulation results








+ εi,t, X1,t−1 − X¯1,t−1 > 0




+ εi,t, X1,t−1 − X¯1,t−1 < 0
(10)
where parameters φa and φb dictate how salaries revert to mean from both above and below the average,
respectively. We simulate the above model with a starting set of salaries for 130 institutions (the average
number of institutions each year of the empirical data is 130.4), with a normal distribution with a mean
of £235,311 and standard deviation of £58,339 (the values in the first year of the survey). We fix the
salary increment (ν) at zero, and set φa = 0.125 and φb = 0.620, values obtained from estimating (9)
with control variables and without taking natural logarithms in pay changes and deviations of pay from the
lagged average. Finally, the error term of annual VC pay is normally distributed with a mean of zero and
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a standard deviation of £40,460, the standard deviation in the changes of pay in the first year of the THE
pay survey. If we simulate the model 100 times over ten time periods, we get average inflation of VC pay of
44.85% (compared with 41.19% in the empirical data). That is, the simple asymmetric benchmarking model
when calibrated to opening data values, tracks inflation in salaries well; however, it does not predict the
variance in closing salaries, where the simulation gets a value of £54,132 compared to £67,367 in the data.
The model suggests that those with below average wages catch up to the mean quickly, whereas those with
above average wages will revert to the mean, but much slower. With such a model, there is a tightening
of the distribution of salaries, with each observation reverting to the mean average. This tightening of the
distribution, however, is not seen in the data.16
Table A21 in the Appendix presents the pay of vice-chancellors by year (and its growth) at different
percentiles of the distribution. As can be seen, the bottom 10 percentile of salaries have seen the lowest
growth in real pay over the decade of just 12%. Beyond those in the lower tail, the remaining below average
salaries has seen the greatest salary increases; the 25th and 50th percentiles have grown at 23% and 21%
respectively. The higher end of salaries have increased at a similar, but slightly lower rate: growth of 17%
and 18% at the 75th and 90th percentile. This is supportive of the asymmetric benchmarking hypothesis with
some institutions consistently paying below and above average salaries in the two tails of the distribution,
with those institutions in the middle of the distribution (in the second quartile), growing their chief executive
salaries the largest.
5.3 Why asymmetric benchmarking?
Despite the empirical evidence of an asymmetric benchmarking behaviour from universities in Table 6 and
7, and support from the simulations exercises above, there is no clear reason why this behaviour should be
present in the market. In this section, we consider the literature, data and further simulations to consider
how and why this asymmetric benchmarking behaviour is observed.
One argument would be that these universities want to pay more than the average either because the
institution is better than average and/or, they want to send a signal to the market of this. Indeed, Carpenter
& Sanders (2004) support this concept and further suggest that paying employees more provides a signal
that the level of human capital is higher within that organisation. Another argument would say that certain
executives have higher power in the market, and can therefore maintain their high salary relative to the
others.17 In such a case, their pay changes act as a positive externality for all executives in the market,
as their salary changes drive up the average, of which those with less power can take advantage (DiPrete
et al. 2010). A third argument is that these VCs, and the remuneration committees setting their wages
may internally look at different market segments against which to compare wages. Indeed, in 2013 when
commenting on the relatively high pay of their VC, the University of Warwick cited that the pay was
comparable with other Russel Group institutions (Grove 2013); that is, the salary was compared against
a more favourable segment of the market than the population average. Faulkender & Yang (2010), Bizjak
16Figure A1 in Appendix A presents a series of simulations varying the value of each calibrated parameter in the model. It
can be seen that higher values of ϕb, ν and variation in both the opening distribution of salaries in the individual pay (ε) lead
to higher overall inflation; higher values of ϕa does the reverse.
17Gritsko et al. (2013) construct a game theoretic model of CEO pay to illustrate that only a small proportion of higher
paying firms compensating higher performing CEOs can lead to an ‘arms-race’ type behaviour, as competition amongst firms
filters through the market.
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et al. (2011) and Laschever (2013) demonstrate the remuneration committees are more likely to chose higher-
paying-CEO firms for benchmarking purposes, holding all else constant. A fourth argument is that higher
paid VCs and their remuneration committees may look externally for benchmarking purposes, analysing
beyond the UK and/or beyond Higher Education. Faulkender & Yang (2010) demonstrate that it is common
for remuneration committees to select benchmark CEOs outside the specific industry, especially if this CEO
is highly paid.18 Finally, it is common in macroeconomic models to maintain the Keynesian belief that
wages are sticky downwards, that is, there is an aversion to pay reductions; this aversion would stop those
above average to regress downwards. For example Shue & Townsend (2017) show that there is a downward
nominal rigidity in CEO pay.
We consider this behaviour further through simulations of a theoretical model applying the empirical
observation that x% of institutions chase the yth percentile of salaries, with x > y, as identified in Crystal
(1992), Bizjak et al. (2008) and Faulkender & Yang (2010). We consider this with a model which starts with
a spread of executive pay values in the opening period with mean and standard deviation as in the first year
of vice-chancellor pay in our data. Each institution in the simulation is then randomly assigned to one of
three groups: an independent, median-chasing, and aspirational group. Those institutions in the independent
group set pay based on a increment (ν) from the previous period for the institution, plus some error (ε); those
in the ‘median-chasing’ group set pay at the previous period’s median pay value plus an increment (ν), plus
an error; and finally, those in the ‘aspirational’ group set pay to the 90th percentile from the previous period
plus an increment (ν), plus an error term. We allow the weight of the median chasing group to be represented
by x1 and that of the aspiration group by x2 and the percentile this group is chasing by y2 (note using this
terminology, y1 = 50). In the benchmark calibration, we use the results of Crystal (1992) to have 65% of
institutions chasing the median and 35% chasing the 75th percentile of the distribution. This is consistent
with the evidence from Tables 7 and A21 which demonstrate that there are institutions which consistent pay
below and above average salaries; Table A21 in particular shows that the real pay increase of the bottom
10% is the lowest of anywhere in the distribution, and that although the rises for those in the middle of the
distribution are higher than those in the upper-tail, the top 25% still see substantial increases in pay and
show little evidence of reverting back to the median. The starting distribution of salaries is calibrated to
match the starting year of our dataset, and the error in each institution’s annual pay is calibrated to match
the standard deviation of the pay rises in the first year of our dataset.
With an annual increment of (ν) of 2% (representing an inflationary increase in salaries) the mean
inflation rate of the ten year simulation is 42.37% (compared with 41.19% in the empirical data) and the
standard deviation of the final period salaries £108,490 (compared with £67,367 in the empirical data). The
key to the simulations is that there is more than one group chasing a target point in the distribution. Were
there only the independent group and the median chasing group, those in the latter category would get to
the median in the second period of the simulation, and all institutions would add an increment and error
each period; as the error has an expected value of zero, expected period inflation is simply the increment.
Inflation can become explosive in the simulations if those chasing a higher point in the distribution are
more than double that of the remaining distribution. For example, say 25% of institutions chase the 90th
18Although this behaviour in remuneration committees would explain levels of inflation in VC pay and an asymmetric use of
benchmarking behaviour, it is still an open question as to why the committees would do this in the first place. Weale (2018)
documents that 47% of VCs are on their own remuneration committees, and a further 42% are allowed to attend the committee’s
meetings.
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percentile; next period, these institutions chasing the 90th percentile will be doing so based the outcome of
the error term for the 40th ((100-90)/25) ‘luckiest’ institution, who is expected to have a positive error term.
That is, the 50th luckiest institution would be expected to have neither good luck or bad luck (ε = 0) and
any institutions above this should have a positive distribution for the error (ε > 0) which results in those
in the chasing group each period inflating their salary above the increment (ν). More broadly, when x% of
institutions are chasing the top z = (100 − y)th in the distribution, if x > z/2, then next period the target
point will be an institution that got a positive error in the prior period, and this drives up inflation in the
model. The calibration of the model in our benchmark simulation does not have this (35% of institutions
chase the top 25% percentile of the distribution) and therefore inflation is not explosive.19
Although the allocation of between the independent, median chasing and aspiration group is based on
an old study (Crystal 1992), it reconciles well with descriptive statistics (Table A21) and the results from
the stimulation are reassuringly in line with the empirical observations. In reality, it would seem logical to
hypothesise that there is a distribution of target points in the distribution of chief executive pay; although the
mean or median may be an attraction for many, others may look at more nuanced points in the distribution.
The results from the simulations (and the sensitivity around these in Figure A2) demonstrate that such
behaviour can lead to empirically consistent changes in pay independent from performance, consistent with
the results from Tables 4, 5 and 6. The key to these models is that the setting of each institution’s VC
pay acts as an externality to those universities targeting some point in the distribution of salaries (DiPrete
et al. 2010); this then can lead to a ratcheting effect, and a race to the top. This assumes that ‘too many’
institutions chase points in the distribution than arithmetic would allow. This behaviour can be explained
through aspirational or signalling motives (signalling to the market that the institution is in the top x% of
institutions by paying in the top x% of institutions) and through bias in the ways in which salaries are set
through remuneration committees.
6 Conclusion
We have analysed the relationship between performance and pay for university vice chancellors in the UK,
using a comprehensive dataset including 154 institutions over a ten years and several performance indicators
related to both teaching and research. There is a correlation between the levels of pay and the reputation
and standing of the university; however, there is no statistically significant association between a change in
pay being correlated with a change in performance. That is, high performing institutions pay higher wages,
but there is limited evidence that these institutions are high performing because they pay higher wages; in
fact, the performance of universities across a wide range of measures is very stable, with performance of a
specific institution maintaining over time. Instead, we find strong evidence of benchmarking behaviour in
UK universities, with salaries of vice-chancellors being set against some point in the distribution of their
peers. Although there are a minority of institutions who pay relatively lower remuneration packages to their
VCs, those with below average pay are estimated to have large increases in salaries to bring them up to
average. Those already with above average pay, have a different aspiration for their salary levels, and these
increase the average in the distribution for all, acting as an externality on pay. We found clear evidence for
19Figure A2 in Appendix A illustrates sensitivity of the results to changing all calibrated parameters one at a time. As is
illustrated, larger increments (ν), target percentiles (y1 and y2), the proportion of those chasing these percentiles (x1 and x2)
and more error in the annual institutional pay increases (ε) leads to higher rates of inflation.
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an ‘asymmetric benchmarking’ behaviour whereby those institutions below average pay regress to the mean,
whereas those with above average pay do not; this behaviour leads to an increasing of the distribution of
pay and can explain the inflation of VC salaries over the sample period.
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Figure A1: Asymmetric benchmarking model simulations



























































































































































Simulations of the asymmetric benchmarking model (10) varying each parameter in turn, using ν = 0.0, φa = 0.125, φb = 0.620,
ε = 40, 460 for the benchmark calibration with the starting distribution of salaries given by N(235311, 58339) as per the data
for the first year in our sample. The model is simulated over ten periods, and the y-axis in the top row provides the inflation
of pay between the start and the end point and the second row illustrates the standard deviation of pay in the final period.

































































































































































































Simulations of the percentile chasing model discussed in Section 5.3 varying each parameter in turn, using ν = 0.0, x1 = 0.65,
y1 = 0.5, x2 = 0.3, y2 = 0.75, and ε = 40, 460 for the benchmark calibration with the starting distribution of salaries given
by N(235311, 58339) as per the data for the first year in our sample. The model is simulated over ten periods, and the y-axis
in the top row provides the inflation of pay between the start and the end point and the second row illustrates the standard
deviation of pay in the final period.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics pay over time
Mean Median StdDev Min Max n
2007 250,448 240,278 51,536 133,149 415,456 106
2008 272,330 254,816 69,145 136,040 708,707 106
2009 295,322 275,874 74,374 142,810 648,193 103
2010 290,557 276,223 65,361 165,907 548,009 105
2011 282,790 273,442 57,369 161,018 461,293 108
2012 279,309 272,263 54,972 161,512 450,759 102
2013 282,946 272,626 59,793 163,454 501,380 103
2014 287,355 275,060 70,278 157,031 639,412 105
2015 301,792 288,006 79,766 140,416 607,784 105
2016 299,837 292,934 71,724 168,538 699,230 107
284,246 273,862 67,272 133,149 708,707 1,050
Descriptive statistics illustrating vice-chancellor pay - including salary, pension and benefits and in 2017 prices – over time.
Table A2: Descriptive statistics pay over time by country
England NI Scotland Whales
2007 252,348 (94) 257,956 (2) 235,829 (9) 188,418 (1)
2008 275,972 (91) 259,366 (2) 256,764 (10) 222,357 (3)
2009 296,548 (89) 274,756 (2) 307,807 (9) 235,188 (3)
2010 292,657 (92) 278,997 (2) 281,644 (9) 245,606 (2)
2011 283,462 (93) 268,725 (2) 290,098 (10) 246,966 (3)
2012 281,203 (89) 249,831 (2) 271,821 (10) 244,516 (1)
2013 287,057 (89) 226,666 (2) 264,798 (10) 247,034 (2)
2014 292,637 (90) 234,006 (2) 263,104 (10) 245,296 (3)
2015 306,824 (90) 259,308 (2) 280,001 (10) 251,792 (3)
2016 302,797 (93) 277,886 (2) 277,773 (10) 294,439 (2)
287,033 (910) 258,750 (20) 272,898 (97) 243,995 (23)
Mean average vice-chancellor pay - including salary, pension and benefits and in 2017 prices – over time.
Table A3: Descriptive statistics pay over time: differences
Mean Median StdDev Min Max
2008 20,536 14,936 40,460 -122,733 293,250
2009 20,669 18,113 68,586 -363,303 424,091
2010 -4,254 2,628 62,991 -398,594 170,205
2011 -5,246 -3,832 44,715 -342,385 149,001
2012 -5,296 -3,820 24,639 -152,906 47,844
2013 5,686 1,942 29,924 -93,856 214,340
2014 4,922 334 34,076 -97,001 257,109
2015 15,031 6,752 52,394 -203,576 313,224
2016 -2,329 1,894 64,537 -323,209 358,953
5,532 3,877 50,235 -398,594 424,091
Descriptive statistics illustrating vice-chancellor pay - including salary, pension and benefits and in 2017 prices – over time in
looking at the difference in salary compared with the prior period.
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics performance variables: levels and differences





Applications 7906.36 767.5 11989.84 5 64280
Acceptances 1571.26 345 2028.41 5 9835
AppAccRatio 4.71 3.95 4.24 0.02 54
CUG 607.6 598 153.55 269 1000
Gaudian 59.32 58.4 13.23 28.9 100






s Applications 212.65 5 1385.5 -9375 10305
Acceptances 47.39 5 290.79 -3130 2910
AppAccRatio -0.05 0 2.96 -44.18 38.82
CUG 12.37 12 32.97 -115 148
Gaudian 0.26 0.1 4.22 -13.2 18.3
REF -0.47 0.24 1.33 -3.63 1.28
Descriptive statistics of performance variables, looking in the top half at levels of the variables and the bottom half changes in
variables.
Table A5: Descriptive statistics academic staff pay over time
Mean Median StdDev Min Max n
2007 47,945 47,480 3,248 40,936 66,910 98
2008 48,778 48,461 2,780 41,869 62,068 108
2009 51,713 51,566 2,895 45,255 64,087 107
2010 51,410 51,597 3,004 44,409 61,292 64
2011 50,901 50,867 2,851 44,106 62,155 107
2012 50,194 50,039 2,989 41,954 61,040 88
2013 49,487 49,524 3,505 30,932 61,079 106
2014 49,302 49,146 3,185 38,753 65,577 108
2015 49,879 49,571 3,380 38,692 66,555 108
49,900 49,740 3,300 30,932 66,910 894
Descriptive statistics illustrating academic staff pay (in 2017 prices) over time with numbers of observations in parentheses..
Table A6: Descriptive statistics academic staff pay over time by country
England NI Scotland Whales
2007 47,992 (88) 45,851 (2) 48,446 (7) 44,477 (1)
2008 48,840 (93) 48,398 (2) 49,442 (10) 44,894 (3)
2009 51,855 (50) 51,288 (2) 51,399 (9) 48,543 (3)
2010 51,408 (94) 50,936 (2) 51,854 (10) 49,715 (2)
2011 50,953 (86) . (0) 51,189 (10) 48,330 (3)
2012 50,206 (89) . (0) 52,043 (1) 47,374 (1)
2013 49,785 (91) 48,184 (2) 49,459 (10) 41,399 (3)
2014 49,403 (93) 47,593 (2) 49,169 (10) 47,774 (3)
2015 50,044 (93) 47,805 (2) 49,494 (10) 47,425 (3)
49,993 (781) 48,579 (14) 50,128 (77) 46,654 (22)
Mean average academic staff pay - including salary, pension and benefits and in 2017 prices – over time with numbers of
observations in parentheses.
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Table A7: Descriptive statistics academic staff pay over time: differences
Mean Median StdDev Min Max
2008 1176 1405 2256 -17865 4246
2009 3133 2908 1672 -939 8828
2010 22 27 995 -2769 3217
2011 -874 -730 982 -3409 3517
2012 -773 -787 861 -6903 1917
2013 -443 -265 1635 -10111 4764
2014 -132 -343 1968 -2739 19175
2015 631 651 831 -2236 3521
468 142 1992 -17865 19175
Descriptive statistics illustrating academic staff pay (in 2017 prices) over time looking at the difference in salary compared with
the prior period.
Table A8: Correlation coefficients: levels
allapp allacc appaccrati CUG Guardian RVC RAll change female inpost whales scotland ni special million university group guildhe russell
allapp 1
allacc 0.9521 1
appaccrati l 0.2221 0.1348 1
0 0
overallscore 0.3239 0.0886 0.523 1
0 0.0026 0
averagetea e 0.2653 0.0618 0.4931 0.9158 1
0 0.0619 0 0
Rsalarypen n 0.5401 0.4918 0.0568 0.4817 0.4526 1
0 0 0.0405 0 0
Raallpay 0.2174 0.1253 0.1743 0.3418 0.3145 0.3324 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
change 0.0182 0.0199 -0.0256 0.0096 0.0009 0.0986 0.0493 1
0.5097 0.4721 0.3546 0.7516 0.9798 0.0004 0.1088
female -0.0674 -0.0544 -0.0657 0.0088 -0.0056 -0.0625 0.0319 0.031 1
0.0145 0.0489 0.0174 0.7705 0.8681 0.024 0.3002 0.261
inpost 0.0159 -0.0047 0.1363 -0.011 0.0246 -0.0009 -0.0879 -0.3048 -0.0493 1
0.5763 0.8693 0 0.7229 0.4777 0.9749 0.0053 0 0.0832
whales -0.0123 0.008 -0.0289 -0.0454 -0.1103 -0.0445 -0.1061 0.0266 0.0915 -0.0671 1
0.4664 0.6465 0.098 0.1229 0.0008 0.1081 0.0004 0.3355 0.0009 0.0184
scotland 0.0958 0.0688 0.0601 0.0527 0.0836 0.0171 0.0398 0.0027 0.1146 -0.0476 -0.0184 1
0 0.0001 0.0006 0.0733 0.0115 0.5368 0.1865 0.9225 0 0.0944 0.2745
ni 0.1307 0.1286 0.0216 0.0311 -0.0353 -0.0165 -0.0285 -0.0109 -0.0583 0.005 -0.0082 -0.0142 1
0 0 0.2169 0.2911 0.2868 0.5528 0.3456 0.6926 0.0347 0.8601 0.6278 0.4004
special 0.0698 0.0306 0.0788 0.1371 0.1713 0.0401 0.2997 0.0321 -0.0382 -0.0539 -0.01 -0.0174 -0.0077 1
0 0.0797 0 0 0 0.1474 0 0.2448 0.167 0.0583 0.5521 0.3023 0.6473
million 0.2412 0.2935 0.0139 -0.4874 -0.4281 -0.0386 -0.1463 0.0515 0.0546 -0.0214 -0.0298 0.1452 -0.0229 -0.0281 1
0 0 0.4258 0 0 0.1634 0 0.0618 0.048 0.4522 0.0774 0 0.1743 0.0956
university e 0.2944 0.3944 -0.0026 -0.1989 -0.1794 0.0213 -0.0495 -0.0223 0.0499 0.01 0.0983 -0.0467 -0.0207 -0.0254 -0.0755 1
0 0 0.8828 0 0 0.4422 0.1009 0.42 0.0708 0.7262 0 0.0056 0.219 0.1316 0
group 0.2155 0.1762 0.0854 0.4064 0.4059 0.1553 0.1963 0.0405 -0.0346 -0.0349 -0.0244 0.0381 -0.0188 0.1215 -0.0684 -0.0619 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1427 0.2104 0.2209 0.1476 0.0238 0.2652 0 0 0.0002
guildhe -0.0113 -0.0015 -0.0037 -0.1583 -0.1973 -0.1559 -0.0967 0.0198 0.0874 -0.0489 -0.0137 -0.0237 -0.0105 -0.0129 -0.0384 -0.0347 -0.0315 1
0.5015 0.9328 0.8322 0 0 0 0.0013 0.4731 0.0015 0.0857 0.4169 0.1591 0.5322 0.4435 0.0229 0.0395 0.062
russell 0.5549 0.4166 0.1628 0.5549 0.4858 0.4516 0.217 -0.0048 -0.0864 -0.0424 -0.0266 0.0284 0.1433 0.1088 -0.0746 -0.0675 -0.0612 -0.0343 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8608 0.0017 0.1365 0.1144 0.0924 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0003 0.0419
Correlation coefficient matrix between pay, performance and control variables. The order of variables are: our performance
variables (‘allapp’ - ‘Guardian’); followed by our pay variables (‘RVC’ - ‘Rall’); followed by variables representing characteristics
of the VC (‘change’, ‘female’ and ‘inpost’; followed by geographical indicators and university group indicators.
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Table A9: Correlation coefficients: REF levels




rallpay 0.1562 0.3842 1
0.0035 0
female -0.0909 -0.032 0.0567 1
0.0884 0.5179 0.2536
inpost -0.0684 0.0038 -0.0657 -0.059 1
0.2065 0.9396 0.1949 0.2404
whales 0.0136 -0.053 -0.1096 0.0691 -0.0476 1
0.798 0.284 0.0259 0.1584 0.3434
scotland 0.0283 0.0167 0.039 0.0972 0.023 -0.0173 1
0.5937 0.7352 0.429 0.0471 0.6479 0.5713
ni 0.0462 -0.011 -0.0295 -0.0585 0.0026 -0.0077 -0.0128 1
0.3832 0.8235 0.5504 0.2326 0.9593 0.8024 0.6766
special 0.1265 0.0476 0.2938 -0.0449 -0.0633 -0.0094 -0.0157 -0.0069 1
0.0166 0.3357 0 0.3595 0.2076 0.7589 0.6089 0.8211
million -0.3275 -0.0249 -0.1298 0.0692 -0.0293 -0.028 0.1529 -0.0207 -0.0253 1
0 0.6146 0.0083 0.1577 0.5598 0.36 0 0.5001 0.4082
universitye -0.1116 0.0511 -0.0367 0.0221 0.0055 0.0948 -0.0418 -0.0185 -0.0227 -0.0676 1
0.0348 0.3012 0.4567 0.6518 0.9124 0.0019 0.1718 0.5459 0.4589 0.0271
group 0.3014 0.1704 0.2088 -0.0388 -0.0434 -0.0228 0.0417 -0.0168 0.1235 -0.0615 -0.0551 1
0 0.0005 0 0.4285 0.3873 0.4558 0.1738 0.5827 0.0001 0.0443 0.0718
guildhe -0.175 -0.1561 -0.0944 0.0783 -0.0597 -0.013 -0.0216 -0.0096 -0.0117 -0.035 -0.0313 -0.0285 1
0.0009 0.0015 0.0552 0.1101 0.2348 0.6719 0.4803 0.755 0.7019 0.2538 0.3068 0.3524
russell 0.3906 0.445 0.2239 -0.0702 -0.0297 -0.0249 0.0324 0.1449 0.111 -0.0671 -0.06 -0.0546 -0.031 1
0 0 0 0.1521 0.554 0.4165 0.2908 0 0.0003 0.0284 0.0498 0.0743 0.311
Correlation coefficient matrix between pay, performance and control variables. The order of variables are: our performance
variables (‘allapp’ - ‘Guardian’); followed by our pay variables (‘RVC’ - ‘Rall’); followed by variables representing characteristics
of the VC (‘change’, ‘female’ and ‘inpost’; followed by geographical indicators and university group indicators.
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Table A10: The impact of performance on pay: full results
Specification (5): Dependent variable ln (X1,i,t) Specification (6): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln(Yi,t) 0.528 0.193 0.025 0.093 0.046 0.488 ∆ [ln (Yi,t)] -0.039 -0.033 0.01 -0.104 0.001 -0.192
(0.000) (0.000) (0.668) (0.346) (0.613) (0.000) (0.331) (0.372) (0.766) (0.273) (0.986) (0.338)
ln(Yi,t−1) -0.391 -0.052 0 0.205 0.187 0.008 ∆ [ln (Yi,t−1)] 0.065 0.016 0.018 0.081 0.076 -0.066
(0.000) (0.328) (0.996) (0.034) (0.041) (0.883) (0.15) (0.662) (0.601) (0.322) (0.301) (0.426)
change 0.046 0.05 0.059 0.067 0.038 0.259 change 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.048 0.031 0.200
(0.033) (0.015) (0.011) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.076) (0.004)
female -0.003 0 -0.017 -0.027 -0.014 0.017 female -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.045
(0.849) (0.98) (0.354) (0.079) (0.427) (0.612) (0.885) (0.904) (0.886) (0.816) (0.957) (0.320)
inpost 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 inpost 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.328) (0.039) (0.06) (0.005) (0.000) (0.055) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.216)
whales 0.061 0.012 0.023 -0.074 -0.032 -0.192 whales 0.031 0.027 0.028 0.034 0.047 -0.183
(0.214) (0.804) (0.675) (0.102) (0.55) (0.034) (0.380) (0.446) (0.425) (0.408) (0.297) (0.153)
scotland 0.063 0.079 0.086 -0.012 -0.01 0.014 scotland -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.039
(0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.586) (0.673) (0.752) (0.847) (0.817) (0.791) (0.911) (0.935) (0.554)
ni -0.139 -0.158 -0.065 -0.146 -0.15 -0.153 ni -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.009 -0.020 0.115
(0.011) (0.003) (0.261) (0.001) (0.004) (0.128) (0.619) (0.596) (0.604) (0.82) (0.638) (0.500)
special 0.037 0.081 0.083 -0.019 -0.043 -0.067 special -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.048 -0.029 0.042
(0.466) (0.098) (0.135) (0.656) (0.449) (0.391) (0.354) (0.364) (0.365) (0.198) (0.566) (0.727)
million 0.033 0.009 0.146 0.086 0.061 0.098 million 0.011 0.01 0.011 0.004 0.007 -0.006
(0.097) (0.64) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.372) (0.403) (0.388) (0.796) (0.689) (0.916)
unialliance 0.039 0.012 0.197 0.071 0.071 0.089 unialliance 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.08
(0.082) (0.575) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) (0.516) (0.556) (0.554) (0.413) (0.315) (0.159)
group 0.141 0.158 0.285 0.070 0.102 0.079 group 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.01 -0.056
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.074) (0.980) (0.957) (0.952) (0.984) (0.588) (0.417)
guildhe -0.076 -0.099 -0.051 -0.045 -0.152 0.021 guildhe 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.01 -0.005 -0.023
(0.035) (0.004) (0.194) (0.221) (0.000) (0.774) (0.667) (0.663) (0.65) (0.757) (0.87) (0.827)
russell 0.221 0.248 0.421 0.203 0.243 0.204 russell 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.007 -0.068
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.585) (0.644) (0.632) (0.959) (0.669) (0.295)
2008 0.137 0.058 0.079 2008
(0.000) (0.039) (0.016)
2009 0.133 0.123 0.151 0.063 2009 0.011 -0.006 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.592) (0.748) (0.887)
2010 0.087 0.121 0.139 0.046 2010 -0.073 -0.083 -0.084 -0.071
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2011 0.106 0.109 0.136 0.025 -0.017 2011 -0.092 -0.094 -0.096 -0.091
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.312) (0.49) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2012 0.147 0.099 0.114 -0.005 -0.038 2012 -0.093 -0.097 -0.095 -0.079 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.84) (0.117) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.667)
2013 0.1 0.075 0.101 -0.012 -0.026 2013 -0.054 -0.066 -0.067 -0.061 0.032
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.652) (0.296) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.091)
2014 0.099 0.083 0.112 -0.026 -0.019 -0.066 2014 -0.065 -0.073 -0.073 -0.056 0.027
(0.001) (0.003) (0) (0.32) (0.432) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.141)
2015 0.153 0.145 0.185 0.012 0.024 2015 -0.024 -0.03 -0.030 -0.02 0.075
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.662) (0.333) (0.195) (0.10) (0.114) (0.309) (0.000)
2016 0.188 0.153 0.189 0.012 0.015 2016 -0.082 -0.09 -0.088 -0.08 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.64) (0.534) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810)
n 1219 1218 1218 925 717 213 n 1064 1063 1063 792 591 97
R
2 0.469 0.464 0.323 0.357 0.391 0.439 R2 (0.079) (0.077) (0.077) (0.07) (0.064) (0.194)
Regressions from specifications (5) and (6) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported in parentheses underneath.
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Table A11: The impact of pay on performance: full results
Specification (7): Dependent variable ln (Yi,t) Specification (8): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (Yi,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln (X1,i,t) 0.68 0.676 0.024 0.051 0.044 0.159 ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] -0.024 -0.046 0.015 -0.036 -0.002 -0.053
(0.001) (0.001) (0.784) (0.187) (0.331) (0.009) (0.582) (0.291) (0.738) (0.094) (0.963) (0.419)
ln (X1,i,t−1) 0.894 0.964 -0.048 0.122 0.12 0.132 ∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] -0.022 0.046 -0.072 0.011 0.021 -0.026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.596) (0.003) (0.012) (0.045) (0.591) (0.258) (0.097) (0.580) (0.462) (0.757)
ln (X2,i,t) -1.089 -2.513 1.416 -0.193 -0.302 -0.073 ∆ [ln (X2,i,t)] 0.321 0.257 0.109 0.003 0.019 -0.196
(0.285) (0.008) (0.001) (0.325) (0.299) (0.770) (0.154) (0.241) (0.642) (0.977) (0.924) (0.573)
ln (X2,i,t−1) 1.142 1.709 -0.544 0.043 -0.246 0.539 ∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] -0.176 0.017 -0.075 -0.201 -0.152 -0.529
(0.253) (0.066) (0.191) (0.821) (0.408) (0.037) (0.322) (0.92) (0.687) (0.027) (0.392) (0.094)
change 0.114 0.083 0.031 -0.024 -0.001 -0.076 change 0.009 -0.031 0.034 -0.002 -0.019 0.014
(0.210) (0.328) (0.406) (0.154) (0.970) (0.070) (0.593) (0.071) (0.063) (0.792) (0.131) (0.744)
female -0.131 -0.153 0.023 0.067 0.047 -0.010 female 0.01 0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.026
(0.069) (0.023) (0.45) (0) (0.002) (0.663) (0.489) (0.355) (0.688) (0.293) (0.847) (0.329)
inpost 0.018 0.004 0.014 0 0.001 -0.003 inpost 0.002 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.546) (0.000) (0.787) (0.367) (0.215) (0.216) (0.646) (0.784) (0.321) (0.385) (0.392)
whales -0.251 0.004 -0.253 -0.005 -0.099 0.115 whales -0.032 -0.053 0.016 -0.016 0.003 -0.051
(0.24) (0.985) (0.005) (0.898) (0.017) (0.04) (0.484) (0.236) (0.730) (0.453) (0.913) (0.496)
scotland 0.036 -0.087 0.121 0.096 0.116 0.032 scotland 0.016 -0.035 0.044 0.000 0.000 -0.025
(0.745) (0.39) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.288) (0.497) (0.112) (0.064) (0.984) (0.988) (0.489)
ni 0.677 0.712 -0.03 -0.007 -0.111 0.074 ni -0.017 -0.048 0.024 -0.017 -0.012 -0.012
(0.007) (0.002) (0.778) (0.866) (0.043) (0.283) (0.758) (0.383) (0.676) (0.519) (0.782) (0.904)
special 0.446 0.182 0.259 0.103 0.245 0.054 special 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.021 -0.063 -0.016
(0.039) (0.364) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000) (0.355) (0.928) (0.931) (0.909) (0.269) (0.056) (0.831)
million 0.636 0.66 -0.028 -0.211 -0.174 -0.099 million -0.004 0.001 -0.014 0.000 0.009 -0.072
(0.000) (0.000) (0.415) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.793) (0.940) (0.386) (0.974) (0.402) (0.021)
unialliance 0.938 0.97 -0.037 -0.023 -0.01 0.029 unialliance -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 0.009 -0.012 -0.034
(0.000) (0.000) (0.305) (0.156) (0.603) (0.258) (0.571) (0.45) (0.677) (0.288) (0.306) (0.283)
group 0.652 0.454 0.188 0.292 0.263 0.146 group 0.012 -0.001 0.002 -0.009 -0.008 -0.110
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.474) (0.956) (0.891) (0.295) (0.512) (0.001)
guildhe 0.351 0.413 -0.057 -0.158 -0.142 -0.143 guildhe 0.008 -0.008 0.005 -0.012 0.001 -0.004
(0.020) (0.003) (0.364) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.785) (0.773) (0.871) (0.419) (0.948) (0.941)
russell 0.887 0.542 0.329 0.313 0.265 0.129 russell -0.015 -0.005 -0.020 -0.013 -0.019 -0.117
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.367) (0.768) (0.237) (0.101) (0.118) (0.000)
2009 -0.070 -0.042 -0.031 0.017 2009
(0.519) (0.679) (0.499) (0.406)
2010 -0.057 -0.177 0.114 0.054 2010 0.113 -0.026 0.134 0.028
(0.651) (0.132) (0.030) (0.023) (0.000) (0.291) (0.000) (0.021)
2011 -0.066 -0.235 0.163 0.062 -0.007 2011 -0.007 -0.023 0.019 -0.03
(0.612) (0.052) (0.003) (0.011) (0.834) (0.798) (0.404) (0.502) (0.028)
2012 -0.119 -0.286 0.163 0.13 -0.048 2012 -0.126 -0.067 -0.053 0.027 -0.007
(0.308) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.020) (0.084) (0.067) (0.719)
2013 -0.124 -0.241 0.114 0.146 -0.006 2013 -0.046 0.027 -0.067 -0.008 0.058
(0.284) (0.025) (0.018) (0.000) (0.826) (0.078) (0.286) (0.015) (0.543) (0.003)
2014 -0.05 -0.187 0.134 0.191 -0.009 0.154 2014 -0.023 0.006 -0.022 -0.004 0.010
(0.647) (0.064) (0.003) (0.000) (0.74) (0.000) (0.365) (0.809) (0.394) (0.757) (0.582)
2015 -0.038 -0.149 0.101 0.198 0.048 2015 -0.061 0.01 -0.051 -0.04 0.059
(0.711) (0.124) (0.020) (0.000) (0.046) (0.005) (0.651) (0.025) (0.000) (0.001)
n 783 782 782 686 585 224 n 577 576 576 506 405 104
R
2 0.494 0.467 0.279 0.765 0.643 0.716 R2 (0.191) (0.075) (0.193) (0.164) (0.181) (0.26)
Regressions from specifications (7) and (8) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported in parentheses underneath.
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Table A12: Sensitivity: The impact of performance on pay: more lags
Specification (5): Dependent variable ln (X1,i,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln(Yi,t) 0.505 0.132 0.066 -0.02 0.05 0.214
(0) (0.035) (0.329) (0.883) (0.647) (0.584)
ln(Yi,t−1) -0.213 0.152 0 0.139 0.121 0.598
(0.07) (0.06) (0.998) (0.388) (0.379) (0.031)
ln(Yi,t−2) 0.046 0.02 -0.056 0.225 0.061
(0.708) (0.808) (0.488) (0.106) (0.663)
ln(Yi,t−3) -0.194 -0.161 0.03 0.023 0.034
(0.011) (0.008) (0.652) (0.824) (0.762)
n 968 967 967 694 496 97
R
2 0.465 0.453 0.305 0.376 0.407 0.426
Specification (6): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
∆ [ln (Yi,t)] -0.04 -0.021 -0.011 0.027 -0.039 -0.192
(0.337) (0.616) (0.783) (0.817) (0.697) (0.338)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−1)] 0.1 0.036 -0.019 0.153 0.142 -0.066
(0.048) (0.371) (0.627) (0.157) (0.133) (0.426)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−2)] -0.138 -0.009 -0.056 0.072 0.044
(0.004) (0.821) (0.142) (0.472) (0.649)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−3)] 0.029 -0.066 0.036 -0.015 0.047
(0.531) (0.08) (0.321) (0.859) (0.62)
n 820 819 819 569 385 97
R
2 0.056 0.049 0.049 0.065 0.072 0.194
Regressions from specifications (5) and (6) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row). For
each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported in
parentheses underneath. Results extend those from Table 4 by including more lagged independent variables in the specification.
Note there are fewer REF assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A13: Sensitivity: The impact of pay on performance: more lags
Specification (7): Dependent variable ln (Yi,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln(X1,i,t) 0.343 0.317 0.026 0.13 0.083 0.082
(0.395) (0.381) (0.868) (0.051) (0.273) (0.179)
ln(X1,i,t−1) 0.613 0.551 0.061 0.068 0.049 0.107
(0.151) (0.15) (0.707) (0.33) (0.538) (0.33)
ln(X1,i,t−2) 0.58 0.538 0.042 0.004 0.012 0.042
(0.126) (0.114) (0.771) (0.954) (0.869) (0.597)
ln(X1,i,t−3) 0.835 0.916 -0.082 -0.026 0.051
(0.011) (0.002) (0.514) (0.635) (0.423)
ln(X2,i,t) -1.528 -3.694 2.165 -0.039 -0.378 0.032
(0.42) (0.03) (0.003) (0.905) (0.384) (0.928)
ln(X2,i,t−1) -0.44 0.712 -1.153 -0.589 -0.216 -0.068
(0.859) (0.749) (0.223) (0.165) (0.702) (0.889)
ln(X2,i,t−2) 1.274 0.565 0.709 0.243 0.098 0.722
(0.529) (0.756) (0.359) (0.494) (0.831) (0.014)
ln(X2,i,t−3) 0.279 1.436 -1.157 -0.016 -0.3
(0.857) (0.302) (0.051) (0.956) (0.438)
n 392 392 392 349 337 106
R
2 0.509 0.505 0.307 0.78 0.669 0.723
Specification (8): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (Yi,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] 0.099 0.068 0.031 0.001 0.038 -0.053
(0.147) (0.374) (0.729) (0.977) (0.51) (0.419)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] 0.037 0.036 0.001 0.04 0.021 -0.026
(0.591) (0.64) (0.992) (0.319) (0.713) (0.757)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−2)] 0.056 0.018 0.038 0.035 0.03 0
(0.3) (0.762) (0.594) (0.282) (0.523) (0)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−3)] 0.004 0.021 -0.017 -0.036 0.045
(0.927) (0.668) (0.767) (0.171) (0.226)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t)] 0.361 -0.197 0.558 0.024 0.05 -0.196
(0.174) (0.508) (0.11) (0.881) (0.863) (0.573)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] -0.192 0.141 -0.333 -0.239 -0.249 -0.529
(0.464) (0.63) (0.333) (0.131) (0.37) (0.094)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−2)] 0.02 -0.148 0.169 0.066 -0.476 0
(0.925) (0.54) (0.553) (0.634) (0.045) (0)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−3)] -0.431 -0.023 -0.408 -0.048 -0.291
(0.09) (0.936) (0.22) (0.786) (0.308)
n 270 270 270 240 230 104
R
2 0.246 0.186 0.083 0.266 0.17 0.26
Regressions from specifications (7) and (8) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row). For
each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported in
parentheses underneath. Results extend those from Table 5 by including more lagged independent variables in the specification.
Note there are fewer REF assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A14: Sensitivity: The impact of performance on pay: fixed effects panel
Specification (5): Dependent variable ln (X1,i,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian REF
ln(Yi,t) -0.019 -0.01 -0.017 -0.08 -0.082 -0.056
(0.622) (0.784) (0.608) (0.319) (0.228) (0.756)
ln(Yi,t−1) 0.018 0.051 -0.037 0.215 0.132 0.011
(0.64) (0.129) (0.241) (0.003) (0.056) (0.828)
n 1219 1218 1218 925 717 213
R
2 witihin 0.021 0.207 0.012 0.166 0.09 0.225
R
2 between 0 0.284 0.002 0.158 0.163 0
R
2 overall 0.213 0.215 0.215 0.133 0.109 0.023
Specification (6): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
∆ [ln (Yi,t)] -0.033 -0.027 0.016 -0.041 0.036
(0.494) (0.517) (0.681) (0.697) (0.647)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−1)] 0.087 0.016 0.028 0.064 0.104
(0.091) (0.696) (0.458) (0.478) (0.209)
n 1064 1063 1063 792 591
R
2 witihin 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.064 0.048
R
2 between 0.03 0.052 0.049 0.005 0.02
R
2 overall 0.083 0.08 0.08 0.068 0.061
Regressions from specifications (5) and (6) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. Results similar to those from Table 4 now using fixed effects panel. Note there are fewer REF
assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A15: Sensitivity: The impact of pay on performance: fixed effects panel
Specification (7): Dependent variable ln (Yi,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
ln(X1,i,t) 0.004 0.02 -0.021 -0.006 -0.014
(0.932) (0.629) (0.633) (0.813) (0.653)
ln(X1,i,t−1) 0.011 0.08 -0.07 0.011 -0.018
(0.822) (0.058) (0.113) (0.646) (0.567)
ln(X2,i,t) 0.576 0.385 0.166 -0.194 -0.037
(0.011) (0.051) (0.423) (0.105) (0.848)
ln(X2,i,t−1) -0.401 -0.095 -0.235 -0.2 -0.128
(0.054) (0.601) (0.216) (0.066) (0.484)
n 783 782 782 686 585
R
2 witihin 0.004 0.072 0 0.036 0.001
R
2 between 0.004 0.127 0.044 0.03 0.118
R
2 overall 0.398 0.204 0.298 0.676 0.2
Specification (8): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (Yi,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] -0.03 -0.056 0.026 -0.02 0.022
(0.414) (0.244) (0.622) (0.413) (0.621)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] -0.038 0.015 -0.053 0.004 0.041
(0.291) (0.74) (0.292) (0.88) (0.264)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t)] 0.337 0.138 0.199 -0.08 0.05
(0.082) (0.582) (0.464) (0.557) (0.836)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] 0.009 -0.061 0.07 -0.298 -0.12
(0.954) (0.758) (0.746) (0.005) (0.585)
n 577 576 576 506 405
R
2 witihin 0.175 0.046 0.149 0.137 0.124
R
2 between 0.036 0.022 0.053 0.04 0.056
R
2 overall 0.329 0.079 0.201 0.156 0.173
Regressions from specifications (7) and (8) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. Results similar to those from Table 5 now using fixed effects panel. Note there are fewer REF
assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A16: Sensitivity: The impact of performance on pay: random effects panel
Specification (5): Dependent variable ln (X1,i,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
ln(Yi,t) 0.097 0.062 0.012 0.052 0.031
(0.009) (0.059) (0.715) (0.476) (0.625)
ln(Yi,t−1) 0.04 0.085 -0.009 0.276 0.236
(0.282) (0.008) (0.772) (0) (0)
n 1219 1218 1218 925 717
R
2 witihin 0.375 0.344 0.032 0.249 0.237
R
2 between 0.372 0.332 0.019 0.257 0.29
R
2 overall 0.195 0.207 0.213 0.126 0.097
Specification (6): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
∆ [ln (Yi,t)] -0.038 -0.032 0.007 -0.093 -0.003
(0.332) (0.385) (0.831) (0.32) (0.967)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−1)] 0.059 0.017 0.013 0.088 0.074
(0.185) (0.637) (0.695) (0.275) (0.306)
n 1064 1063 1063 792 591
R
2 witihin 0.076 0.075 0.074 0.065 0.056
R
2 between 0.063 0.086 0.086 0.03 0.06
R
2 overall 0.081 0.079 0.078 0.067 0.058
Regressions from specifications (5) and (6) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. Results similar to those from Table 4 now using random effects panel. Note there are fewer REF
assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A17: Sensitivity: The impact of pay on performance: random effects panel
Specification (7): Dependent variable ln (Yi,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
ln(X1,i,t) 0.081 0.071 0.025 0.031 0.031
(0.103) (0.096) (0.546) (0.213) (0.314)
ln(X1,i,t−1) 0.085 0.13 -0.028 0.046 0.028
(0.091) (0.003) (0.512) (0.068) (0.373)
ln(X2,i,t) 0.616 0.381 0.336 -0.029 0.176
(0.009) (0.061) (0.101) (0.819) (0.363)
ln(X2,i,t−1) -0.298 -0.036 -0.115 -0.058 0.084
(0.171) (0.845) (0.543) (0.612) (0.647)
n 783 782 782 686 585
R
2 witihin 0.097 0.16 0.024 0.126 0.149
R
2 between 0.181 0.219 0.001 0.03 0.182
R
2 overall 0.391 0.199 0.292 0.668 0.18
Specification (8): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (Yi,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] -0.028 -0.051 0.017 -0.027 -0.002
(0.433) (0.232) (0.709) (0.201) (0.948)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] -0.035 0.044 -0.072 0.013 0.017
(0.306) (0.277) (0.093) (0.525) (0.553)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t)] 0.313 0.273 0.112 0.003 -0.021
(0.097) (0.209) (0.63) (0.978) (0.916)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] -0.054 0.02 -0.057 -0.209 -0.158
(0.714) (0.908) (0.754) (0.02) (0.369)
n 577 576 576 506 405
R
2 witihin 0.178 0.067 0.185 0.146 0.156
R
2 between 0.044 0.143 0.214 0.142 0.171
R
2 overall 0.328 0.068 0.185 0.15 0.16
Regressions from specifications (7) and (8) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. Results similar to those from Table 5 now using random effects panel. Note there are fewer REF
assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A18: Sensitivity: The impact of performance on pay: three year time periods
Specification (5): Dependent variable ln (X1,i,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
ln(Yi,t) 0.528 0.193 0.025 0.093 0.046
(0) (0) (0.668) (0.346) (0.613)
ln(Yi,t−1) -0.391 -0.052 0 0.205 0.187
(0) (0.328) (0.996) (0.034) (0.041)
n 1219 1218 1218 925 717
R
2 0.469 0.464 0.323 0.357 0.391
Specification (6): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (X1,i,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
∆ [ln (Yi,t)] -0.039 -0.033 0.01 -0.104 0.001
(0.331) (0.372) (0.766) (0.273) (0.986)
∆ [ln (Yi,t−1)] 0.065 0.016 0.018 0.081 0.076
(0.15) (0.662) (0.601) (0.322) (0.301)
n 1064 1063 1063 792 591
R
2 0.079 0.077 0.077 0.07 0.064
Regressions from specifications (5) and (6) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. Results similar to those from Table 4 now using three year time periods. Note there are fewer REF
assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
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Table A19: Sensitivity: The impact of pay on performance: three year time periods
Specification (7): Dependent variable ln (Yi,t)
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
ln(X1,i,t) 0.68 0.676 0.024 0.051 0.044
(0.001) (0.001) (0.784) (0.187) (0.331)
ln(X1,i,t−1) 0.894 0.964 -0.048 0.122 0.12
(0) (0) (0.596) (0.003) (0.012)
ln(X2,i,t) -1.089 -2.513 1.416 -0.193 -0.302
(0.285) (0.008) (0.001) (0.325) (0.299)
ln(X2,i,t−1) 1.142 1.709 -0.544 0.043 -0.246
(0.253) (0.066) (0.191) (0.821) (0.408)
n 783 782 782 686 585
R
2 0.494 0.467 0.279 0.765 0.643
Specification (8): Dependent variable ∆ [ln (Yi,t)]
App Acc AppAccR CUG Guardian
∆ [ln (X1,i,t)] -0.024 -0.046 0.015 -0.036 -0.002
(0.582) (0.291) (0.738) (0.094) (0.963)
∆ [ln (X1,i,t−1)] -0.022 0.046 -0.072 0.011 0.021
(0.591) (0.258) (0.097) (0.58) (0.462)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t)] 0.321 0.257 0.109 0.003 0.019
(0.154) (0.241) (0.642) (0.977) (0.924)
∆ [ln (X2,i,t−1)] -0.176 0.017 -0.075 -0.201 -0.152
(0.322) (0.92) (0.687) (0.027) (0.392)
n 577 576 576 506 405
R
2 0.191 0.075 0.193 0.164 0.181
Regressions from specifications (7) and (8) for the six different measures of performance (as labelled in the first heading row).
For each result, the coefficient on the performance variable is reported with the p-value associated with this coefficient reported
in parentheses underneath. Results similar to those from Table 5 now using three year time periods. Note there are fewer REF
assessment periods limiting further analysis with this performance measure.
Table A20: Asymmetric bargaining model: regression results for academic staff
All Below Ave Above Ave All Below Ave Above Ave
Coefficient -0.147*** -0.170*** -0.190*** -0.170*** -0.178*** -0.362***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
n 874 687 187 845 665 180
R2 0.078 0.078 0.045 0.480 0.652 0.469
Similar analysis as 6 now presenting results for academic staff.
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Table A21: VC salary distribution and growth rates
Percentile
Year Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
2007 233,385 162,682 195,300 232,249 270,332 306,166
2008 255,569 175,241 219,846 249,128 286,668 332,171
2009 267,138 192,064 231,241 265,782 307,275 349,890
2010 271,867 197,244 236,484 270,677 308,394 354,986
2011 268,207 176,885 232,121 265,461 305,716 363,921
2012 269,553 175,526 233,885 265,778 305,113 341,259
2013 268,605 187,540 227,615 264,269 312,318 348,877
2014 274,731 181,663 234,006 269,415 307,903 383,852
2015 271,452 178,338 233,684 275,194 309,675 352,576
2016 279,079 182,582 240,768 281,274 316,278 361,152
Growth rates
2008 9.51 7.72 12.57 7.27 6.04 8.49
2009 4.53 9.60 5.18 6.68 7.19 5.33
2010 1.77 2.70 2.27 1.84 0.36 1.46
2011 -1.35 -10.32 -1.84 -1.93 -0.87 2.52
2012 0.50 -0.77 0.76 0.12 -0.2 -6.23
2013 -0.35 6.84 -2.68 -0.57 2.36 2.23
2014 2.28 -3.13 2.81 1.95 -1.41 10.03
2015 -1.19 -1.83 -0.14 2.15 0.58 -8.15
2016 2.81 2.38 3.03 2.21 2.13 2.43
19.58 12.23 23.28 21.11 17.00 17.96
Real vice-chancellor pay over time for different parts of the distribution; the top half of the table gives the actual numbers,
whereas the bottom half gives the growth rates.
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